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Abstract 
 
The increasing havoc wrecked by catastrophic incidents on organisations worldwide, as well as the increasing 
devastating effects of these incidents, has necessitated the development of a framework to improve the 
reliability of organisations.  Despite operating in tightly coupled and complex technologies, high reliability 
organisations (HROs) continue to operate mindfully with minimal incidents. Given that most disasters have 
occurred in organisations and industries not considered as truly HROs, this paper argues that applying 
organisational learning from HROs across diverse organisations in different industries could potentially reduce 
organisational disasters. This paper recognised the numerous researches in HRO theory, but noticed the 
unavailability of a harmonized measurable framework that could be standardized and applied across diverse 
organisations. Using the HRO principles, this paper conducted a research in 8 organisations, in 3 industries 
across 2 continents. It developed the organisational reliability maturity model (ORM2) to track the progression 
organisations through 5 maturity levels. It developed the framework for organisational reliability maturity 
(FORM) to measure maturity levels of organisations, predict potentials for disasters, benchmark, and 
improvement organisations. It is hoped that this paper will deepen existing research in disaster prevention and 
HRO theory, while opening up new areas of knowledge.  
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1. Introduction 
The old English saying “don’t spoil the ship for a ha'p'orth of tar”, which means that one should not risk the 
failure of a large project by trying to make savings on trivial things, suggests that catastrophic failures could be 
prevented by implementing minor but timely activities. Studies have shown that most catastrophic failures have 
been caused by series of seemingly minor and retrospectively avoidable individual and organisational 
behaviours (Labib & Read, 2013; 2015; Labib, 2014; Savioja et al, 2014; Waring, 2015; Harvey et al, 2016; Li, 
2016). Despite operating with complex technologies in highly hazardous environments, and with tightly coupled 
processes, where minor failures could result in catastrophes, certain organisations continue to operate with 
nearly error free and harm free performance. They continuously avoid failures, or operate such that failures do 
not result in catastrophe. Should catastrophic failures eventually occur, these organisations are able to withstand 
the consequences. Weick & Sutcliffe, (2007; 2015) referred to them as High Reliability Organisations (HROs). 
Given the continuously remarkable safety records, these highly reliable organisations are therefore highly safer 
organisations. 
 
Research into organisational reliability has been conducted in a number of industries. These have included 
transportation, aviation and military (Roberts et al, 1994; La Porte & Consolini, 1998; Busby, 2006; Jeffcott et 
al, 2006; O’Neil, 2011); nuclear (Bierly & Spender, 1995; Ashley et al, 2009); fire and disasters (Keller, 2004; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Berardi, 2010); and healthcare (Baker et al, 2006; Frankel et al 2006; Madsen et al, 
2006; Roberts et al 2005; Stralen et al 2006; Tamuz & Harrison, 2006; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007a; Costella et al, 
2009; Riley, 2009; Samuels, 2010; Sutcliffe, 2011; Hales & Chakravorty, 2016). There have also been some 
HRO research with respect to space (Schulman, 2008); energy (Hoffmann et al, 1995; Miller, 2009; Hopkins, 
2009; Lekka & Sugden, 2011); education (Stringfield, 1995; Taylor & Angelle, 2000; Azzaro, 2005; Bellamy et 
al, 2005; Stringfield et al, 2008);  food retail (Ciravenga & Brenes, 2016); Information technology ( Valorinta, 
2009; Carlo et al, 2012) and virtual organisations (Grabowski & Roberts, 2016). Some have aimed at the 
relationship with other concepts such as resilience engineering (Aven & Krohn, 2014; Righi et al, 2015; 
Bergstrom et al, 2015; Haavik et al, 2016; Harvey et al, 2016; Le Coze, 2016) and safety (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2007a; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007b; Ausserhofer et al, 2013; Vogus et al, 2014; Vogus & Iacobucci, 2016).  There 
is no evidence of a research conducted across different types of organisations at the same time to test the theory, 
demonstrate how it could be progressively achieved. Such research would not only provide a balanced 
perspective about the HRO theory, but would also show the extent to which the theory could be standardized 
across organisations with diverse characteristics. Furthermore, HRO researches have been mostly reactive. 
While some have studied how the HRO theory could have helped avoid catastrophic events retrospectively, 
others have mostly studied the HROs with the view to understanding behaviours make them reliable – the end 
point. This research is more interested in the “journey” than the “end point” - it is more interested in how 
organisations could become reliable.  
 
This paper expands the HRO study to different and diverse organisations at the same time horizon using the 
same methodology in an attempt to obtain a balanced data. It tries to demonstrate that organisations could make 
progressive improvements over time as they tend towards higher reliability. To achieve this, there must be a 
means to measure the expected behaviours from HROs, assess the extent to which organisations exhibit these 
behaviours, as well as a framework that guides the organisation towards becoming HROs. Zietsma et al (2002) 
had identified the four feed-forward learning process as means for organisations to learn in the face of 
considerable external changes. Tsoukas & Mylonopoulos (2004) focused on the processes, practices and 
strategies through which knowledge is constructed and created in organisations. While these are important 
aspects towards achieving reliability, they do not specify simplified step wise approaches for adoption.  Weick 
et al (2008) acknowledges the need for a roadmap for HRO implementation. Hales & Chakravorty (2015) 
attempted to “articulate” these and “show how to systematically implement HROs using a soft research methods 
approach moderated with mindfulness”. This purely qualitative work involved a close collaboration between the 
researchers and the different people within a hospital on issues of organisational reliability, as well as training 
and mentoring. It does not however answer some basic question: How do we measure the reliability of the 
organisation? At what point does the organisation move from being reliable to not being reliable or vice versa? 
How do we compare the reliability of different organisations? How do we measure which organisation to apply 
these systematic processes to? These could be achieved through a staged maturity framework.  
 
Chassin & Loeb (2011; 2013) had developed a staged maturity model to guide organisations towards the path of 
higher reliability (Sullivan et al, 2016). This had focused on the organisational characteristics of leadership, 
safety culture and process improvement, mapped in three maturity stages of minimal, developing and 
approaching reliability. They rightly recommended organisational self-assessment as an important first step. 
While this is very detailed within the context it addresses, the model focuses narrowly on a healthcare 
organisation with no clear path to expand to different industries. Furthermore, they focused narrowly on the 
three dimensions of leadership, safety culture and process improvement. While these are worthy characteristics, 
organisational mindfulness goes beyond leadership and safety culture. It is concerned with a focus on a ‘clear 
and detailed comprehension of emerging threats, and on factors that interfere with such comprehension’ (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007). It is organisational consciousness characterized by ‘being (1) situated in the present, (2) 
sensitive to context and perspectives, (3) guided (but not governed) by rules and routines’ (Langer, 2014). 
Mindfulness ensures everyone, not just leadership, works and communicates collectively with a common 
purpose to focus on what really matters based on current situational realities (Sutcliffe et al, 2016; Agwu, 2018). 
Organisational mindfulness comprises of five interrelated behaviours at multiple organisational levels: 
preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and 
deference to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Developing the model in line with these five interrelated 
behaviours at multiple organisational levels would therefore make more sense. It would enhance the 
identification of expected behaviours at different maturity levels for each of the five mindfulness principles, 
making it easy to actualize the organisational self-assessment goal identified by Chassin & Loeb (2011; 2013), 
and develop improvement plan.   
 
The paper therefore developed the Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM2) as a five stage maturity 
model that maps organisations into various stages of organisational reliability. It further developed the 
Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM), a framework that leverages on the Organisational 
Reliability Maturity Model (ORM2) to develop a stepwise organisational reliability learning and improvement 
process. The research behind this paper was conducted in eight organisations purposively selected from three 
industries between July 2016 and January 2017, using the same research methods.  The next section will further 
discuss some related concepts such as disasters, HROs and organisational learning. Section three will describe 
the data collection and analysis process, and the results. Section four will describe the proposed maturity model 
and measurement framework for organisational reliability maturity, while section five will describe the various 
applications of the measurement framework. Section six shall conclude paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.0        Disasters, HROs and Organisational Learning 
2.1 Disasters  
Labib & Read (2015) considered disasters as black swans with the distinct attributes of rarity, extreme impact, 
and retrospective predictability. Within the late twentieth and the twenty first centuries, the incidence of 
disasters has accelerated. This is due in part to the increasing complexity of the world and its technologies 
(Taleb, 2010), increasing populations and environmental changes (Rougier et al, 2010), and increasing 
stakeholder demands. A trend of these safety incidents over the years ties the causative factors to mostly 
organisational and individual errors. Reviews of the 1912 Titanic disaster that killed an estimated 1514 
passengers and crew, considered management decisions and other human factors as key causative factors (Labib 
& Read, 2013). The March 2005 BP Texas city disaster led to 15 fatalities, injured 170 people, and resulted in 
damages worth hundreds of millions of dollars (Labib & Read, 2013). Again, management decisions and 
employees’ actions and inactions were considered to be the major causative factors. Similarly, management 
decisions were among the contributory factors to the April 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine (INSAG, 
1992), NASA’s Columbia’s incident of 2003 (Labib & Read, 2013); the 2010 BP Deep water horizon incident; 
(Labib, 2014); the Rio-Paris Flight 447 (Moura et al, 2016), the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster (Labib & 
Harris, 2015), and the 2000 Concorde crash (Labib, 2014) all share similar characteristics of the significance of 
management and people related retrospectively avoidable causative factors. In some cases, the organisations 
involved could not recover from the social and financial impact of these disasters. In some other cases, the 
organisations were resilient and withstood the financial and social impact and evolved to become stronger and 
more competitive organisations. This paper hopes to tap from the understanding of the differences between 
these organisations to develop a harmonized framework for organisational reliability. 
A lot of organisations and industries could certainly benefit from HRO theory implementation. Hudson (2007) 
described the need to oil and gas organisations highly reliable. This is more imperative given the frequency and 
severity of incidents within the industry over the last few decades. Although the work by Hudson (2007) stayed 
more within the ambits of safety, it however set the stage for a more robust HRO implementation for oil and gas 
organisations. The work developed a staged maturity model that tracks the safety culture of organisations 
through five maturity levels: ‘pathological’, reactive, ‘calculative’, ‘proactive’, and ‘generative’. Alothman 
(2016) used two analytical paradigms – the quantitative scales audit and the qualitative template analysis to 
assess the organisational reliability of an oil and gas organisation.  
 The manufacturing cluster is often overlooked by the HRO researchers despite the potential for disasters. Since 
the Lawrence Massachusetts Pemberton Mill disaster in January 10 1960 that resulted in 145 fatalities and 166 
serious injuries, the manufacturing industry has continued to witness catastrophic incidents. Between September 
2012 and April 2013 (table 1), recorded industrial disasters contributed to over 1530 mostly retrospectively 
avoidable loss of lives, potentially preventable through mindfulness.  
Table 1: List of Industrial Disasters 
 
In most of these disasters the “ha'p'orth of tar” was neglected, and in other cases, the acceptable behaviours 
changed and perceptions of ‘norm’ shifted. Food contamination could also be another major source of disasters 
and history is rife with such incidents with multiple fatalities. 732 people were infected with E.coli in 1993 
when Jack in the Box restaurant served infected burger across 73 locations in the United States (Schlosser, 
2001; Nestle, 2010). 4 children died, and 178 people were left with permanent damage. E.coli outbreak has 
affected so many other major restaurant chains including KFC, McDonald’s, Sizzler, Wendy’s, and Taco Bell 
all with catastrophic consequences. Burger King was forced to recall 25 million pounds of beef from 650 
locations in 1997 after E. coli contamination got 16 customers sick (Janofsky, 1997). In 2003, 640 people were 
affected and 4 died in Pennsylvania, USA, when tainted tomatoes at Chi-Chi’s restaurant caused a hepatitis A 
outbreak. The reputation of the organisation never recovered.  The reputation of Chipotle took a major hit in 
Date Incident Location Effect
January 10. 1860 Pemberton Mill Factory Collapse
Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, USA 154 Fatalities, 166 injuries
March 20. 1905 Shoe factory explosion
Brockton, Massachusetts, 
USA 58 Fatalities, 150 Injuries
March 25. 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire New York City, USA Over 100  Fatalities
Nov 23. 1984 MESIT Factory Collapse Czechoslovakia 18 Fatalities, 43 Injuries
May 4. 1988 PEPCON Chemical Explosion Nevada, USA 2 Fatalities, Over 300 Injuries
May 10. 1992 Kader Toy Factory Fire Thailand 188 Fatalities, Multiple Injuries
May 13. 2000 Enscede Fireworks Depot Disaster Enscede, The Netherlands
24 Fatalities, 947 injuries, 1500 
homes destroyed, Over US$300 
million insured losses
Nov 3. 2004 Seest Fireworks factory Disaster Kolding, Denmark
1 fatality, 24 Injuries, 2107 
buildings destroyed, about 100 
million Euros insured damage
Dec 6. 2006 Falk Gear Factory Explosion Milwaukee, Wisconsin
3 fatalities, 47 Injuries, Multiple 
building damages.
April 18. 2007 Qinghe Steel Factory Disaster China 32 Fatalities, multiplr injuries
Feb 1. 2008 Fireworks Fire Disaster Istanbul, Turkey 22 Fatalities, over 100 Injuries
Sept 11. 2012 Ali Garments Factory Explosion Karachi, Pakistan 289 Fatalities, Multiple Injuries
Nov 24. 2012 Tasreen Factory Disaster Dhaka, Bangladesh 112 Fatalities, Multiple Injuries
April 24. 2013 Savar Factory Disaster Dhaka, Bangladesh 1,129 Fatalities, Multiple Injuries
2015, when an affected almost 500 customers across 14 states of America (Carr, 2016). 43 restaurants were 
closed, the stock shrunk by 30%, and nearly one-third of the sales disappeared. This paper posits that these 
disasters could have been avoided had these organisations taken steps towards improving their mindfulness by 
adopting the principles of high reliability organisations.   
  
2.2 High Reliability Organisation (HRO) Theory 
Perrow (1984), had described the inevitability of accidents in complex organisations with the argument that no 
matter how well a system is managed, accidents are inevitable, as long as the system is characterised by 
complexity and tight coupling.The HRO researchers countered this with the argument that some organizations, 
despite complex technologies and tightly coupled processes, have consistently prevented and contained 
catastrophic failures (Roberts, 1990; LaPorte & Consolini, 1998) by creating and reinforcing certain behaviours 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993). Since the first research in the 1980s, different researchers have studied HROs from 
different theoretical lenses. Despite their diverse views, their point of commonality considers HROs as nearly 
error free and harms free organizations (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003). Weick & Sutcliffe (2001; 2007; 2015) 
developed five behaviours that enhance the reliability of an organisation. The first three deal with the capacity 
of the organisations to anticipate unexpected problems. These are preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify, and sensitivity to operations.  
 
Preoccupation with failure is a characteristic of HROs that enables them to actively seek for signals within their 
systems that could indicate a potential for failure. They continuously learn and improve and consider near 
misses as progressive cautions that drive proactive and pre-emptive analyses of possible vulnerabilities 
(Sutcliffe, 2011). They avoid being reactive with failures, rather continuously focus on potential points of failure 
through management and organisational cultural progressions (Hales & Chakravorty, 2016). Key preoccupation 
behaviours of observing, reporting and documenting near misses and incidents are key steps to eliminate or 
reduce the incubation period in Turner’s man-made disaster model (Turner, 1978). The lookouts in Titanic had 
noticed some haze within the horizon ahead of them but failed to report (Barratt, 2010), thus lack of 
preoccupation ended up being one of the reasons for the Titanic disaster.   
 
Reluctance to simplify shows how organisations continuously balance simplification and standardization of 
processes, with undue generalisations. They have standardized processes, yet actively seek divergent viewpoints 
that question received wisdom, uncover blind spots and detect changing demands (Sutcliffe, 2011).  The NASA 
Challenger disaster could have been prevented had the management not oversimplified the flaw in the O-Rings 
designs when their engineers reported the issue. They had known for over 11 years prior to the crash that the 
design of the O-rings in the solid rocket booster had a potentially catastrophic flaw, yet they disregarded several 
warnings from their engineers about the potential catastrophic implication of launching the rocket at low 
temperatures (Vaughan 1997). They waived 6 launch constraints related to O-rings that could have prevented 
the launch, and by extension, the disaster. They oversimplified the problem and wrongly defined it as an 
acceptable risk. With time, these became norms – norm that would lead to catastrophe. Vaughan (1997) called 
this a “normalization of deviance”,  a situation where “people within the organization become so much 
accustomed to a deviant behaviour that they don't consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far exceed 
their own rules for the elementary safety”.  The Challenger example is closely related to preoccupation with 
failure. NASA received warnings about the potential for disaster, with similar occurrences in the past. The 
organisation did not consider these near misses as progressive cautions to drive proactive and pre-emptive 
analyses of possible vulnerabilities (Sutcliffe, 2011).  
 
Finally, sensitivity to operations is the HRO characteristics that determine their responsiveness to the details of 
their operations, with the right staffing, competence levels, and motivation. They recognize that a solution to 
one problem may create another problem; they therefore maintain a big picture of their processes and mix their 
awareness and alertness of expectations with actions that unfold in real time (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). 
Investigations into the Piper Alpha disaster (Broadribb, 2014), BP Texas City incident (Labib & Read, 2013) 
and the Deep Water Horizon incident (Labib, 2014) revealed that the disasters resulted from behaviours related 
to sensitivity to operations. These include inadequate communication among staff, inadequate communication 
between staff and management, insufficient duty of care, poor operational decision making by those responsible, 
breakdown of the chain of command, and inadequate maintenance and safety practices. Others include deviation 
from procedures, inadequate supervision, unclear chain of command, ambiguity in roles and responsibilities, 
inadequate hazard identification, inadequate trainings, and delays in reacting to signals.  
 
The last two are principles are concerned with the capacity of the organisations to contain the unanticipated 
problems when they occur. These are commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise.  
Commitment to Resilience is concerned with the ability of organisations to not only effectively anticipate errors 
but also to cope with and bounce back from errors and ‘unexpected events’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2015; Lekka, 
2011). The Columbia shuttle  had no emergency response processes built into the system to enable effective 
rescue missions and on-orbit repairs by the shuttle astronauts should the need arise. The emergency response 
practices leading up to the Texas City and Deepwater Horizon incidents were considered inadequate and at best 
chaotic by the post disaster investigations.  
Deference to Expertise on the other hand shows that HROs rely on a hierarchical structure with clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities during normal operations. During emergencies however, decision making is yielded to 
people with the most subject matter knowledge and experience, irrespective of their rank (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2015). The Piper Alpha incident (Broadribb, 2014), is a clear example of the dangers of not deferring to 
expertise during emergencies. The staff at the neighbouring platforms Tartan and Claymore were experienced 
enough to know they should shut down their facilities to reduce the effect of the incident, but waited for 
shutdown instructions from their hierarchical leadership. The longer they waited for their hierarchical superiors, 
the more oil was pumped into already flaming Piper Alpha the higher the disaster escalation. Organisations must 
therefore learn from HROs.  
 
2.3 Organisational Learning  
Organisational learning is a critical component for organisations to develop competitive advantage (Un & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Tsoukas & Mylonopoulus, 2004). For organisational learning to be effective, there must 
be a flow of knowledge, as well as a reinforcement or change in behaviours (Saka-Helmhout, 2007). Zietsma et 
al (2002) acknowledged that organisational learning could be achieved through well-defined processes. Tsoukas 
& Mylonopoulus (2004) agreed with the well-defined process approach and argued that such knowledge 
presupposes work and that for the knowledge to be effective there must be clear cut strategies and incentives to 
shape it. This paper develops the views of Zietsma et al (2002) and Tsoukas & Mylonopoulus (2004) further by 
developing the maturity model and maturity framework that outlines well defined processes and clear cut 
strategies to advance organisational learning.  Given the benefits of adopting HROs, it is clear that non-
traditional HROs should begin to learn from the HROs. Weick (2002) considered organisational learning from 
the mindfulness perspective and outlined mindful behaviours that HROs work to improve on, and which 
organisations must learn from as they tend towards organisational maturity. Provera et al (2010) enhanced this 
further with emphasis on the “no blame approach to organisation learning” as exhibited by HROs. This paper 
agrees with both the perspectives Weick (2002) and Provera et al (2010), but argues that learning from HROs 
should be more holistic than narrow and should be backed by empirical data. This paper therefore embarked on 
research across different organisations in diverse industries in search of empirical data to back up these 
arguments and in the process developed the framework to measure the mindfulness of organisations with the 
measurement focusing on specifying the degree of maturity with each dimension (construct) of HRO 
mindfulness. 
 
2.4 Maturity Models 
Maturity models are frameworks that describe the methodical progression through successive stages of maturity 
with incremental maturity behavior towards the desired maturity behaviour. Despite some criticism of maturity 
models especially in small and medium scale organizations (Beadell, 2009; Huang & Zhang, 2010; Uskarci & 
Demirors, 2017), research indicates that organisations with higher maturity levels are expected to have 
competitive advantages in the marketplace (Backlund et al, 2014; Nikkhou et al, 2016), and as such would 
provide opportunities for continuous organisational learning. Uskarci & Demirors (2017) noted that most of 
these short comings would largely be the result of the quality and motivation levels of employees during 
implementation. It would therefore be imperative to emphasize that positive contributions of employees during 
implementation is key to the success of the maturity model for any size of organisation. Crosby’s (1979) quality 
management maturity model paved the way for research into maturity models. It mapped organisations into five 
maturity levels: Uncertainty, Awakening, Enlightenment, Wisdom, and Certainty. It worked on the premise that 
organisations could progress through the five levels and strive towards “perfection” at level “certainty”. Recent 
similar maturity models include maintenance management maturity model (Antil, 1991; Fernandez et al, 2003; 
Oliveira, 2012), the energy management maturity model (Introna et al, 2014), the portfolio management 
maturity model (Nikkhou et al, 2016), and the maturity model for production management (Kosieradzka, 2017).  
 
Whereas Crosby’s model stems from quality, ORM2 stems from reliability. Labib et al (2009) had discussed the 
many similarities between quality and reliability. They defined reliability as the ‘ability of an item to perform a 
required function under given conditions for a given time interval', and quality as the 'ability of an item to 
perform a required function under given conditions'. In other words, quality is fitness for purpose at an instant of 
time, whereas reliability is also fitness for purpose but over a period of time’. Given these similarities, the 
maturity model that originated from the quality domain could help organisations achieve higher reliability. As 
most disasters have occurred in organizations outside the traditional HROs, while HROs have sustained relative 
stability in reliability and safety, this paper expects the HRO behaviours to be the benchmark behaviours for 
maturity level five.  
3.0 Methodology 
3.1  Data Collection 
The research was conducted using a quota based purposive sampling technique to determine organisations 
where rich and contrasting information would be obtained. The three industries: oil and gas, beverage 
manufacturing, and restaurant chains, were selected to highlight industries often ignored by HRO researchers, 
but with potentials for incidents of catastrophic proportions. The organisations were purposively selected with 
considerations to contrasting sizes, geographical spread, age, and market share, to reduce potential bias and add 
depth and diversity to the data. Organisation A was purposively selected due to perceived expectations that it 
should mirror the expected behaviours from an HRO. This is purely for triangulation purposes and to help 
identify and establish benchmark behaviours for organisational reliability.  Organisations B, C, D are peers 
within the oil and gas industry with contrasting sizes, geographical spread and years in operation. Organisations 
E and F; and G and G are also peers with contrasting characteristics. Table 2 describes the organisations. The 
organisations are not necessarily the same level of risk takers but the expectation is that in this diversity, the 
different behaviours of diverse organisations at different maturity levels could help deepen the research.  
Table 2: Summary of organisations 
 
 
The sample was demographically stratified in terms of current responsibility and years of experience. 
Considering current responsibility, the research adopted a medium span of control (Gupta, 2010) of 10-20% - 
20-40% - 40-60% ratio for managers, supervisors, and staff. Span of control here refers to the number of direct 
reports a particular manager or supervisor has at any given time. The research used  a five level experience 
Organisation Considerations Questionnaires Interviews
A
Multinational organization. Expected enhanced processes and 
culture. To be used for triangulation 40 6
B
Multinational organization. Expected enhanced processes and 
culture. Large employee base. 50 10
C
cal organization. Smaller than B, but Larger than D. Newer than 
B, but older than D. 30 5
D Local organization. New. Small employee base 30 5
E Large operational base. National spread. Decades of operation. 50 10
F Regional operational base. New organization 50 10
G Regional operational base. New organization 50 10
H Large operations base. National spread. Decades of operation. 70 15
RESEARCH PARTICIPAPTION
Oil and Gas
Beverage Manufacturing
Restaurant Chain
stratification of below three years; between three to seven years; above seven years and below 15 years; 15 to 25 
years; and above 25 years to enhance diversity of responses.  
The research adopted a pragmatic philosophy. It combined surveys and interviews to obtain objective, verifiable 
and generalizable data, as well as capture the subjective realities inferred through feelings, intuitions, 
experiences and individual world views of the diverse respondents. Input to the questionnaires came from 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2007; 2015) and input from industry experts and refined after the pilot survey. The survey 
differs from Weick & Sutcliffe (2007; 2015) by increasing the range of questions to include the contributions by 
industry experts and introducing check questions to enhance the research reliability. In addition, the research 
introduced a five points rating scale in place of the combination of two point and three points scales used by 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2007). Finally the questions followed a logical sequence of events as they would occur in 
real life, while the respondent is made to become part of the research by the consistent use of the pronouns ‘we’ 
and ‘our’. The questionnaire has five sections with each section representing one of the five HRO principles. For 
all questions, the responses ranges from one to five with one representing strongly disagree and five 
representing strongly disagree. The organisational reliability behaviours are expected to improve as the response 
tends towards five from one. 
The interviews were semi-structured with questions based on the questionnaires but geared towards obtaining 
the personal impressions of the interviewee. These were used to triangulate and validate the results. The 
selection of interviewees followed the same methods as the questionnaires and stratified to accommodate 
diversity in terms of experience and responsibility. The questions were designed to get the interviewee talking 
with “what”, and “how” questions and follow up questions. For example: “If someone interrupts the process to 
forestall a catastrophic failure, what would happen? What if it turns out to be a false alarm?” 
 
3.2  The Results 
In terms of responsibilities, the result validated the expected span of control with an average ratio of 15% - 37% 
- 48% ratio for managers – supervisors – staff as shown on the table below. A – H represents the 8 organisations 
and the figures represent the total percentage of respondents for each of the organisation.  
Table 3 – Demographic Spread based on Responsibilities 
 
A B C D E F G H Total Average
Shop Floor 57.50% 40.00% 56.67% 50.00% 46.00% 40.00% 50.00% 42.86% 383.02% 48%
Supervisors 30.00% 40.00% 33.33% 33.33% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 42.86% 299.52% 37%
Managers 12.50% 20.00% 10.00% 16.67% 14.00% 20.00% 10.00% 14.29% 117.45% 15%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100%
RESPONSIBILITIES
There was also a fairly average even split among the various demographics in terms of the years of experience. 
The service organisations G and H however had very little representation in the medium to higher experience 
groups. This was probably due to weaker compensation and welfare packages in these organisations and is 
perhaps worth a further research. 
Table 4 – Demographic Spread based on Years of Experience 
 
 
Tables 5 to 9 show the results of the survey based the five HRO principles. Columns A to H represent the eight 
organisations, while the figures represent the generalized average for each organisation for each response level. 
Considering the respondents’ assessment of their organisations’ preoccupation with failure, company A at 
74.17% mostly showed the behaviours expected from HROs. All the other organisations exhibited behaviours 
indicative of varying levels of maturity. Similar results were obtained when assessing the responses based on the 
other HRO principles as shown in tables 6, 7, 8, and 9.  
 
Table 5 – Assessing Preoccupation with Failure 
 
Table 6 – Assessing Reluctance to Simplify 
 
Table 7 – Assessing Sensitivity to Operations 
 
A B C D E F G H Total Average
> 25 17.50% 12.50% 16.67% 23.33% 20.00% 4.00% 0.00% 0.00% 94.00% 11.75%
15 - 25 30.00% 27.50% 43.33% 26.67% 18.00% 8.00% 6.00% 1.43% 160.93% 20.12%
>7<15 17.50% 35.00% 20.00% 26.67% 32.00% 28.00% 18.00% 2.86% 180.03% 22.50%
3 - 7 Yrs 17.50% 15.00% 16.67% 16.67% 18.00% 38.00% 40.00% 54.29% 216.12% 27.01%
< 3 17.50% 10.00% 3.33% 6.67% 12.00% 22.00% 36.00% 41.43% 148.93% 18.62%
100.00%
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 74.17 7.50 7.56 1.11 2.80 0.27 0.00 0.00 93.40 11.68
Partially Agree 11.33 25.83 20.44 23.56 7.33 3.07 2.53 0.76 94.86 11.86
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 9.83 33.67 38.44 35.78 17.33 16.93 13.73 9.52 175.25 21.91
Partially Disgree 4.67 17.50 22.22 26.22 24.80 38.93 37.47 40.67 212.48 26.56
Strongly Disagree 0.00 15.50 11.33 13.33 47.73 40.80 46.27 49.05 224.01 28.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
PREOCCUPATION WITH FAILURE
A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 91.46 15.63 0.28 5.56 2.83 2.50 0.00 0.00 118.25 14.78
Partially Agree 8.54 22.71 16.94 18.89 23.00 12.83 3.67 3.33 109.92 13.74
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 0.00 30.21 30.00 25.56 32.83 28.00 28.50 27.98 203.07 25.38
Partially Disgree 0.00 24.79 35.83 28.89 27.17 32.83 41.00 43.93 234.44 29.31
Strongly Disagree 0.00 6.67 16.94 21.11 14.17 23.83 26.83 24.76 134.32 16.79
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
RELUCTANCE TO SIMPLIFY
Strongly Agree A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 86.82 19.77 8.48 20.00 8.73 5.64 0.18 0.91 150.53 18.82
Partially Agree 9.09 27.05 24.85 32.12 23.82 18.36 6.91 7.14 149.34 18.67
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 2.27 32.50 35.76 20.30 28.18 24.91 31.45 26.88 202.26 25.28
Partially Disgree 1.82 15.68 25.15 16.97 24.91 28.55 38.36 40.00 191.44 23.93
Strongly Disagree 0.00 5.00 5.76 10.61 14.36 22.55 23.09 25.06 106.43 13.30
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
SENSITIVITY TO OPERATIONS
  
Table 8 – Assessing Commitment to Resilience 
 
Table 9 – Assessing Commitment to Resilience 
 
 
Another observation was perhaps the obvious schism between the responses of the different strata of the 
organisations, and that this is common among all the organisations further strengthens the reliability of the 
research. For instance, when considering preoccupation with failure in organisation B, all managers chose 
option 3 and above for the question “we do not victimize people who make mistakes” while all the respondents 
on the shop floor chose options 2 and below. Similarly, for the communication comments such as “we feel free 
to talk to our superiors”; our superiors freely talk to us about our problems; and “our superiors actively seek 
out bad news about potential issues”, all the managers chose options 3 and above. On the other hand, all the 
respondents on the shop floor chose options 3 and below; with 90% of them disagreeing partially or fully. This 
was a common observation in all the HRO principles and in all the organisations studied. This schism indicates 
a huge gap between the different strata of the organisations, both in terms of communicating, understanding, and 
implementing the processes required to exhibit the high reliability behaviours and should therefore be 
considered during the implementation of the maturity framework.  
The results from the semi structured interviews helped understand the reasons the survey results. This 
understanding would help in the development and implementation of the framework and in its application 
organisational improvement.  
 
3.3  Reliability and validity 
The research ensured reliability by the simplicity and clarity of the wordings so that the meanings would remain 
A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 95.63 30.63 5.00 16.39 13.50 6.33 0.17 0.48 168.12 21.01
Partially Agree 2.50 37.92 28.33 15.28 28.17 22.33 13.33 5.83 153.69 19.21
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 1.46 21.25 41.94 36.11 39.50 25.17 26.00 16.67 208.10 26.01
Partially Disgree 0.42 8.33 17.50 26.11 18.17 29.00 34.67 37.14 171.34 21.42
Strongly Disagree 0.00 1.88 7.22 6.11 0.67 17.17 25.83 39.88 98.76 12.34
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
COMMITMENT TO RESILIENCE
A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 96.88 6.25 1.67 11.25 4.00 6.75 0.50 0.00 127.29 15.91
Partially Agree 3.13 15.63 12.08 17.08 16.50 17.75 11.25 1.61 95.02 11.88
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 0.00 17.81 19.17 20.83 22.50 21.75 22.75 22.50 147.31 18.41
Partially Disgree 0.00 25.31 26.25 23.75 24.75 23.75 26.00 32.50 182.31 22.79
Strongly Disagree 0.00 35.00 40.83 27.08 32.25 30.00 39.50 43.39 248.06 31.01
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
DEFERENCE TO EXPERTISE
the same with different respondents. To verify this, responses within similar strata in the same organisation were 
mostly similar and consistent. Responses in alternative forms of questions introduced at random throughout the 
questionnaire were also mostly similar. Table 10 shows a comparison of the alternative forms ‘we have well 
defined emergency plans’ and ‘we have well defined contingency plans’ in the commitment to resilience section. 
A well-developed emergency response plan would normally have a well-developed contingency plan and as 
such similar responses was expected, and mostly similar responses were obtained. 
Table 10 – Comparison of the results from the emergency/contingency check questions 
 
 
A similar result was obtained from all the alternative forms including in the deference to expertise section as 
shown in table 11 for the questions: ‘people in the organisation value expertise over rank’ and ‘we are expected 
to take expert decisions irrespective of position or rank’.  
 
Table 11 – Comparison of the results from the expertise over rank check questions 
 
 
4.0 The Framework 
4.1 The Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM2) 
The first step towards maturing organisations towards reliability would be to develop an objective and 
measureable framework to measure organisational reliability. As a popular adage goes, “you can’t manage what 
you can’t measure”, or as some others choose to put it, “you can’t improve what you can’t measure”. The 
research developed the organisational reliability maturity model (ORM2), as a 5S model that tracks the 
progression of organisations through 5 maturity levels (table 12). 5S here refers to the five maturity stages: 
silent, starter, stable, sustain, and summit. ORM2 comprises of 25 boxes containing 25 sets of organisational 
Availability of defined emergency plan Availability of defined contingency plan
Company A 100% at level 5 100% at level 5
Company B 100% at levels 4 & 5 100% at levels 4 & 5
Company C 100% at levels 4 & 5 100% at levels 4 & 5
Company D 100% at levels 4 & 5 100% at levels 4 & 5
Company E 32% (5), 30% (4), 26% (3), 12% (2), 0% (1) 32% (5), 30% (4), 26% (3), 12% (2), 0% (1)
Company F 100% at levels 1-3, 78% of which are at levels 1-2. 100% at levels 1-3, 88% of which are at levels 1-2. 
Company G 100% at levels 1 - 3 100% at levels 1 - 3
Company H 0% (5), 0% (4), 8% (3), 38% (2), 54% (1) 0% (5), 0% (4), 8% (3), 38% (2), 54% (1)
Value expertise over rank Expert decisions irrespective of position or rank
Company A 100% at level 5 100% at level 5
Company B 100% at level 1 & 2 90% at level 1 & 2
Company C 0% (5), 0% (4), 6.67% (3), 36.6% (2), 56.6% (1) 0% (5), 0% (4), 6.67% (3), 36.6% (2), 56.6% (1)
Company D 100% at level 1 & 2 87% at level 1 & 2
Company E 100% at level 1 & 2 82% at level 1 & 2
Company F 100% at level 1 & 2 92% at level 1 & 2
Company G 100% at level 1 & 2 97% at level 1 & 2
Company H 100% at level 1 & 2 96% at level 1 & 2
reliability behaviours. The maturity levels are on the x-axis with incremental maturity behaviours as the boxes 
progress towards the right hand side. The y-axis represents the five HRO principles. This means that for each 
HRO principle, there are five sets of organisational reliability behaviours, with incremental improvements as the 
levels increase from level 1 (silent) towards level 5 (summit). The model begins with a “silent” period (level 
1), a passive period characterised by lack of standardized processes, poor communication, inadequate 
procedures, combative and punitive relationships, and a false sense of safety and security – an “if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it mentality”. As the organisation begins to realise the dangers of remaining in a “silent” period, it 
begins to develop some processes. It also begins to take steps towards improving communication, developing 
procedures, trainings, and competence development exercises. It begins to encourage near miss and incident 
reporting. The organisation at this stage is considered a “starter” and is said to have begun its teething process. 
At a point, the processes and procedures for most jobs and will become fully developed and everyone will 
understand and work the process with an almost mechanical precision. People comply because they have to. In 
most cases, the organisation would have slogans such as “if you decide not to comply with the process, you have 
decided not to work with us”. The emphasis is clear: comply or be sacked, and people are therefore compelled to 
comply. Employees would attend meetings at regular times because they have to, attend trainings because they 
have to, and participate in appraisals because they must. This is the “stable” stage, where the organisation is 
expected to be fully standardized and working with clockwork efficiency. 
At level 4, “sustain”, the people begin to understand and agree with the reasons for the processes and 
procedures and actually begin to take the initiative to own the process. They begin to see themselves as 
stakeholders to help sustain the process. An emergency drill will no longer be seen as a necessary burden to 
please the leaders, but as a necessary tool towards personal and organisational resilience. People begin to own 
their learning and development and would begin to see feedback as a positive process for organisational and 
personal improvement. The organisation would begin to proactively feed lessons learned back into the process 
to improve it. The organisation begins to value and reward sceptics and those that think outside the box and 
meetings will begin to become useful avenues for improvement discussions. The final level is the “summit”, a 
stage where the relationships between the leaders and the led, and among the people in the organisation becomes 
very respectful, people actively seek 360 degrees feedback and accept the objective feedback as a performance 
improvement opportunity. People are mindful of the operations and take proactive decisions to safeguard and 
improve the process. Everyone works proactively without coercion, with a common purpose to improve and 
sustain the organisation. Organisations in level five are highly reliable and the behaviours included here are 
selected based on numerous previous HRO studies. ORM2 sets out the expected behaviours for each maturity 
level. It becomes more useful when applied with the measureable framework for organisational reliability 
maturity (FORM).  The elements that enhance mindfulness are not exhaustive, therefore the elements included 
within each maturity stage under each HRO principle (table 12) is not exhaustive. Industries could use this 
framework and extend mindfulness behaviours specific to such industry.   
Table 12: Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM2) – The 5S Model 
 
Level 1 (Silent) Level  2 (Starter) Level 3 (Stable) Level 4 (Sustain) Level  5 (Summit)
Preoccupation 
with Failure
Failure/Near Misses are not reported. 
Punishment for people that cause incidents. 
Management difficult to approach. 
Continuous mindset that failure will not 
happen. If a failure occurs, someone is always 
to blame.
Failure/Near misses sometimes reported and 
rectified. Root causes may not be identified.  
People that cause incidents are perceived as 
incompetent but may not be punished. Some 
communication with a few people.
Failure/Near misses reporting process exists and 
is generally enforced. Root causes identified. 
People often blamed. Superiors communicates 
with frontline to give clear instructions. 
Failure/Near misses reported. Root causes identified and 
people not blamed. Clear and open communications. 
Worst case scenarios considered in planning.  Lessons 
learned documented.
Failure/Near Miss identified, categorized, documented. 
Root causes identified. Root causes resolved with no 
blame on people. Lessons learned reviewed periodically 
and used to improve the system. People that report near 
misses/failure are actively rewarded. Superiors actively 
seek out bad news. Clear and open communication 
between superiors and front line staff. Planning 
considers worst case scenarios. Continuous reviews to 
seek out hot spots. 
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Skeptics and people that challenge the norm 
are mostly victimized and punished as 
disruptors. 
Skeptics and people who challenge the norm 
may not be punished, but may be viewed 
negatively 
A process for challenging the process exists. It  
is ok to challenge the norm. Implementation 
may be delayed by layers of bureaucracy. 
Views from skeptics and out of the box thinkers are 
respected and often implemented by management. 
Management actively creates forums for people to 
challenge the norm and out of the box thinkers are 
rewarded. 
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Meetings are rare without quality:  no focus 
on long/short term team/organization. 
Leaders are unaware of frontline issues. 
People generally do not understand jobs 
outside their specialty. Feedback is viewed as 
a process of negative reinforcement. There is 
no feedback process. People are generally 
overworked and stressed out. Complaints are 
viewed as insubordination and could be 
punished 
Occasional meetings with no defined terms of 
reference. Leaders request for and receive 
reports as desired. People may understand jobs 
outside their competencies, but rarely get 
involved. People generally do not care about 
feedback. Might receive one during annual 
appraisal. There are occasional breaks to relieve 
work stress
Regular Meetings with defined terms of 
reference. A clearly defined work report 
process exists and is enforced. A formal process 
exists and is generally enforced for people to 
learn jobs outside their competencies and get 
involved. A feedback process exists and is 
generally enforced. There is a process to 
manage workloads
Regular Meetings are regular with defined terms of 
reference and individual roles/responsibilities. Leaders  
generally get involved in the frontline day to day 
activities and therefore receive first hand reports.  
People are generally willing to get involved in jobs 
outside their competencies and the opportunities exist 
for them to do so. People generally give and receive 
feedback at defined times without coercion. Leaders 
continuously monitor workloads and add resources as 
required.
Meetings are regular with defined terms of reference and 
individual roles/responsibilities. It  is clear how 
everyone's roles fits into the  big picture. Frontline and 
leaders are generally free with one another and interact 
freely in day to day operations.  People are rewarded for 
getting involved in jobs outside their competencies. 
People actively seek feedback, and perceive 360* 
feedback as constructive exercises. Leaders continuously 
work with staff to monitor workloads and would 
collectively determine need for additional resources. 
Commitment to 
Resilience
The company does not organize/sponsor 
trainings. Competencies and skills are not 
assessed. There are no emergency response 
and contingency plans. 
Trainings exist, but only used to reward favoured 
staff. Individual leaders assess competencies and 
skills in their own way. There are emergency 
response and contingency plans but people are 
generally not aware of them. Drills are regarded 
as nuisance. 
There is a formalized training and 
competence/skills assessment for all staff and 
the plan is generally enforced. Emergency drills 
are done and people are mandated to 
participate. People are generally mandated to 
understand the emergency 
response/contingency plans
Leaders and staff work together to identify training and  
development gaps and close them. Competence 
assessment is an ongoing process and feedback is 
constructive. People actively seek to  understand and 
review emergency response and contingency plans. 
People regard drills as ways to potentially save lives
People generally have more than enough skills for their 
jobs and to act during emergencies. Competence and 
skills assessment is a proactive process. Emergency 
response and contingency plans are robust and 
implementation is a shared responsibility among all 
staff. Everyone trusts one another and relies on one 
another during emergencies.  
Deference to 
Expertise
In an emergency, the most senior person 
takes responsibility irrespective experience. 
It  is difficult to know who has the most 
expertise for each emergency. 
People generally know who has the most 
expertise during an emergency. Hierarchical 
rank takes precedent during emergencies. The 
most senior person feels insulted if not in charge 
during emergencies. 
There is a formal process to determine who 
takes responsibility during each emergency. 
The most senior person yields responsibility to the 
person with the most expertise for during each 
emergency. The expert accepts the responsibility 
professionally and yields back after the emergency. 
Expertise for all emergencies is readily available
There is a mutual respect for one another's jobs. No job 
is considered more important than the other. People are 
encouraged to take expert decisions irrespective of 
hierarchy during emergencies. People feel responsible 
until problems are resolved.
ORGANIZATIONAL RELIABILITY MATURITY MODEL
4.2 The Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) 
The framework has multi-faceted features; the most significant of which is the standardized measurement for 
organisational reliability. With this measurement come four different functions. First, it is a health check that 
assesses the current maturity level of organisations. Secondly, the framework could use the current 
organisational reliability behaviours to predict the future direction of the organisation. The third function is the 
ability to benchmark organisations against desired maturity standards. The final function lies in the ability to 
enhance organisational learning and performance improvement. To develop FORM, the organisation must first 
conduct a survey using ORM2 or its variant tailored to suit organisational needs. This has been field tested in 
eight diverse organisations with similar results.  
Using the values obtained from the survey as summarized in tables 5 to 9, Table 13 shows FORM table for 
company C.  All subsequent tables will pull data from tables 5 to 9, which is the summary of the research data. 
Table 13: Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) 
 
The five HRO principles are mapped into five levels that correspond with the five maturity levels on the 
Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM2). The values corresponding with each HRO principle is the 
average percentage score for all the respondents in each of the five maturity levels and sums up to 100%. The 
levels on the other hand correspond with the selections 1 to 5 on the questionnaire. This means that for this 
organisation, 7.56% of the respondents consider the organisation to exhibit the maturity level 5 behaviours in 
their preoccupation with failure. 40.83% on the other hand consider the organisation to be at maturity level 1 in 
their deference to expertise behaviours.  Maturity levels could be determined at individual HRO principle level 
or at the general organisation level. The maturity of the organisation is determined by the level with the highest 
average score. The average score column is a simple average of responses from the five HRO principles in each 
maturity level. With 33.06% as the highest average score, company C is considered to be at maturity level 3 
(stable). The performance in each of five principles could give an indication of how much resources the 
organisation could commit to one principle over the others to achieve improvement.  
 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 7.56 0.28 8.48 5.00 1.67 4.60 0.14
4 20.44 16.94 24.85 28.33 12.08 20.53 0.62
3 38.44 30.00 35.76 41.94 19.17 33.06 0.00
2 22.22 35.83 25.15 17.50 26.25 25.39 0.77
1 11.33 16.94 5.76 7.22 40.83 16.42 0.50
COMPANY C (OIL &GAS))
The last column is the pull, and it indicates the maturity level where the organisation has the most potential of 
slipping into given prevailing conditions. Pull (P) is a simple probability: 
𝑷 = 𝟏 − (𝑹 − 𝑹𝒊)/𝑹 
R is the average score for the assigned maturity level of the organisation, while Ri  is the average score for the 
maturity level under consideration. For Table 13, 33.06% is the highest average score R. Considering level 5 
(summit), the average score Ri is 4.6%. Substituting R and Ri in the pull calculation above, the pull towards level 
5 (summit) will be 0.14. The same process is applied to other maturity level to obtain their pull. From these 
calculations, the pull is highest towards maturity level 2 (starter) at 0.77. This means that the organisation has 
the highest probability of slipping into a level 2 (starter) from its current maturity level 3 (stable), given its 
prevailing organisational reliability behaviours. There is an equally strong pull towards level 1(silent) at 0.50 
and organisation must be careful not only to slide into level 2 (starter), but could potentially move further down 
towards level 1(silent). 0.5 is considered the low pull, while 0.77 is considered the high pull. The framework 
shows that the higher the pull, the more the probability of the organisation to move towards that maturity level. 
In addition to applying the pull to the entire organisation considering the averages of the HRO principles, it can 
be applied to each HRO principle to determine its potential risk factors to the organisation.  
 
Table 14: Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) for individual HRO principles 
 
 
In table 14 above, the pull is applied to the preoccupation to failure and the commitment to resilience principles. 
Company C is at maturity level 3 (stable) on both principles but is being pulled differently on both. It is strongly 
pulled at 0.58 down towards level 2 (starter) in preoccupation to failure, and at 0.68 up towards level 4 (sustain) 
in commitment to resilience. The pull in this instance could help the organisation prioritize resources to achieve 
a higher overall maturity level. The sum of all the values in each HRO principle, as well as the sum of the 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure Pull
Commitment to 
Resilience Pull
Average Pull for 
all 5 Principles
5 7.56 0.20 5.00 0.12 0.11
4 20.44 0.53 28.33 0.68 0.60
3 38.44 0.00 41.94 0.00 0.00
2 22.22 0.58 17.50 0.42 0.77
1 11.33 0.29 7.22 0.17 0.50
FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANISATIONAL RELIABILITY MATURITY
COMPANY C (OIL &GAS))
average scores should always be 100%. All numbers, except the pull, are percentages of responses. The next 
section describes the various applications of FORM and ORM2.  
 
5.0   Applications of FORM and ORM2 
5.1 Assessing organisations 
Table 15 shows organisation H to be at maturity level 2 (starter), with an average score of 38.85%. It also shows 
the individual strengths and weaknesses of the organisation with respect to each of the five HRO principles. It 
show for instance that although “H” is generally at maturity level 2 (starter), it is at level 1 (silent) in its 
preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilient, and deference to expertise behaviours.  The framework 
therefore helps organisations to perform a health check. ‘H’ would observe the very thin line between its level 2 
and level 1 positions, where it could easily slide from one to the other. It would also understand the need to 
improve its performances in preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. 
With this measurement, the organisation could then begin to develop improvement measures.  
 
Table 15: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for Company H 
 
 
5.2  Predicting the future and preventing potential disasters 
Being able to predict the future is the elusive crystal ball that all have desired and few have achieved. This 
framework utilizes the ORM2 and the assessment in section 5.1 to predict future behaviour of the organisations. 
Organisations with lower maturity levels have weaker organisational reliability behaviours, and are potentially 
more prone to disasters Perhaps, understanding such future behaviour could potentially become the key to 
incident prevention.  Using company G as an example (table 16), the organisation currently on maturity level 2 
(starter), could potentially retrogress to maturity level 1(silent) if it continues with its current behavioural 
trends. The pull of 0.91 towards level 1 (silent) is very strong and would more likely cause the organisation to 
retrogress towards level 1 than improve towards level 3 where the pull is 0.69. This suggests that given current 
practices, the organisation is an “accident waiting to happen” with an increasing potential for an incident. 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.48 0.00 0.28 0.01
4 0.76 3.33 7.14 5.83 1.61 3.74 0.10
3 9.52 27.98 26.88 16.67 22.50 20.71 0.53
2 40.67 43.93 40.00 37.14 32.50 38.85 0.00
1 49.05 24.76 25.06 39.88 43.39 36.43 0.94
FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANISATIONAL RELIABILITY 
COMPANY H (RESTAURANT CHAIN)
Table 16: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for Company G 
 
This predictive feature is much more useful when utilized at the level of individual HRO principles. The 
organisation is already at the lowest level in its preoccupation with failure and deference to expertise. This 
means that near misses and incidents are not reported, and that the communication line between management 
and frontline is very difficult at best. It also means that expertise is often sacrificed on the altar of hierarchy. 
Combining these behaviours suggests that a disaster could be imminent. The potential is not only very high; the 
ability of the organisation to manage the disaster when it occurs is very low. On the other hand, the organisation 
could be predicted to improve to level 3 (stable) in its reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, and 
commitment to resilience. The pull towards levels 3 and 1 in commitment to resilience are too similar that the 
correct prediction might be too close to call between improving towards level 3, and retrogressing towards level 
1. In such instance, it would be safe to assume a worst case scenario. From table 15, company H is at level 2 in 
its reluctance to simplify. With a strong pull towards level 1, the organisation could be predicted to retrogress 
towards level 1 with a much higher probability of catastrophic incidents.  
 
Without previous baseline data, it might be challenging to show if the pull is towards improvement of away 
from improvement. For instance, from table 16, the average pull of 0.91 could indicate that the current reliability 
behaviours are pulling the organisation towards level 1. However, an earlier pull of 0.99 towards level 1and a 
lower pull of 0.61 towards level 3 could indicate that the organisation is actually improving towards level 3. 
This means that for an effective prediction, the baseline measurements must be established.  
 
5.3  Benchmarking organisations 
Organisations could use this framework to benchmark against a desired maturity level, against best in class, 
against peers, or for internal benchmarking. Best in class here would mean HROs. One of the first steps here 
would be to obtain baseline measurements using the process outlined in section 5.1. Objective data collection 
should not be limited to surveys but could be extended to action research and case studies based on its 
organisational realities.  Table 17 shows a high level comparison of the 8 organisations surveyed. Black 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.17 0.50 0.17 0.00
4 2.53 3.67 6.91 13.33 11.25 7.54 0.21
3 13.73 28.50 31.45 26.00 22.75 24.49 0.69
2 37.47 41.00 38.36 34.67 26.00 35.50 0.00
1 46.27 26.83 23.09 25.83 39.50 32.30 0.91
COMPANY G (RESTAURANT CHAIN)
coloured boxes represent the current average maturity level, while grey coloured boxes represent the high pull. 
Assuming company A is the benchmark, all other organisations would compare their average maturity levels, as 
well as the levels for the individual HRO principles against company A’s performance.  
Table 17: Comparing average organisational maturity 
 
For instance, company B has a stable organisational reliability maturity (level 3) with a pull of 0.95 towards 
level 4 (sustain). Similarly, companies C, D, and E have stable maturity levels (level 3) but with pulls of 0.77, 
0.88, and 0.82 respectively towards level 2 (starter).  On the other hand, companies F, G, and H are on maturity 
levels 2, with pulls of 0.88, 0.91, and 0.94 respectively towards level 1 (silent). At a glance, each organisation 
could see the degree to which they are apart from the best in class. Figure 5 shows a graphical visualization of 
table 17. 
 
Figure 5 – A graph showing a high level comparison of the organisations 
 
The blue curve represents the current maturity level and corresponds with the black boxes on table 17. The red 
curve represents the high pull and corresponds with the grey coloured boxes in table 17. The graph simplifies 
the representation, while the table gives some more details. The graph easily shows that company A is more 
mature than B, and B is more mature than C (because of the pull). For C, D, and E, and F, G, and H, the 
differences are not very apparent on the graph but become clearer from the details on table 17.  
 
The framework could also provide a detailed benchmark of the individual HRO principles for the organisations 
as shown on table 18 and expanded further on figure 6 to figure 10.  
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT LEGEND
COMPANY A
COMPANY B 0.47 0.68 ML 0.95 0.59 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
COMPANY C 0.59 0.77 ML 0.62 0.14 HIGH PULL
COMPANY D 0.56 0.88 ML 0.77 0.39
COMPANY E 0.77 0.82 ML 0.69 0.22
COMPANY F 0.88 ML 0.76 0.49 0.14
COMPANY G 0.91 ML 0.69 0.21 0
COMPANY H 0.94 ML 0.53 0.1 0.01
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
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 Table 18: Detailed organisational maturity comparison 
Considering preoccupation with failure, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ are on level 3. ‘B’, pulling towards level 4, is more 
mature than ‘C’ and ‘D’ that are pulling towards level 2. Applying the pull calculation to ‘C’ and ‘D’ will show 
that ‘C’ with a pull of 0.65 towards level 2 is more matured with respect to preoccupation with failure than ‘D’ 
with a pull of 0.73 towards level 2. The same process could be applied to all the other HRO principles.   
 
 
Figure 6 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their preoccupation with failure. 
 
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT
COMPANY A
Preoccupation with failure 0.00 4.67 9.83 11.33 74.17
Reluctance to Simplify 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.54 91.46
Sensitivity to operations 0.00 1.82 2.27 9.09 86.82
Commitment to resilience 0.00 0.42 1.46 2.50 95.63
Deference to expertise 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.13 96.88
COMPANY B
Preoccupation with failure 15.50 17.50 33.67 25.83 7.50
Reluctance to Simplify 6.67 24.79 30.21 22.71 15.63
Sensitivity to operations 5.00 15.68 32.50 27.05 19.77
Commitment to resilience 1.88 8.33 21.25 37.92 30.63
Deference to expertise 35.00 25.31 17.81 15.63 6.25
COMPANY C
Preoccupation with failure 11.33 22.22 38.44 20.44 7.56
Reluctance to Simplify 16.94 35.83 30.00 16.94 0.28
Sensitivity to operations 5.76 25.15 35.76 24.85 8.48
Commitment to resilience 7.22 17.50 41.94 28.33 5.00
Deference to expertise 40.83 26.25 19.17 12.08 1.67
COMPANY D
Preoccupation with failure 13.33 26.22 35.78 23.56 1.11
Reluctance to Simplify 21.11 28.89 25.56 18.89 5.56
Sensitivity to operations 10.61 16.97 20.30 32.12 20.00
Commitment to resilience 6.11 26.11 36.11 15.28 16.39
Deference to expertise 27.08 23.75 20.83 17.08 11.25
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
COMPANY E
Preoccupation with failure 47.73 24.80 17.33 7.33 2.80
Reluctance to Simplify 14.17 27.17 32.83 23.00 2.83
Sensitivity to operations 14.36 24.91 28.18 23.82 8.73
Commitment to resilience 0.67 18.17 39.50 28.17 13.50
Deference to expertise 32.25 24.75 22.50 16.50 4.00
COMPANY F
Preoccupation with failure 40.80 38.93 16.93 3.07 0.27
Reluctance to Simplify 23.83 32.83 28.00 12.83 2.50
Sensitivity to operations 22.55 28.55 24.91 18.36 5.64
Commitment to resilience 17.17 29.00 25.17 22.33 6.33
Deference to expertise 30.00 23.75 21.75 17.75 6.75
COMPANY G
Preoccupation with failure 46.27 37.47 13.73 2.53 0.00
Reluctance to Simplify 26.83 41.00 28.50 3.67 0.00
Sensitivity to operations 23.09 38.36 31.45 6.91 0.18
Commitment to resilience 25.83 34.67 26.00 13.33 0.17
Deference to expertise 39.50 26.00 22.75 11.25 0.50
COMPANY H
Preoccupation with failure 49.05 40.67 9.52 0.76 0.00
Reluctance to Simplify 24.76 43.93 27.98 3.33 0.00
Sensitivity to operations 25.06 40.00 26.88 7.14 0.91
Commitment to resilience 39.88 37.14 16.67 5.83 0.48
Deference to expertise 43.39 32.50 22.50 1.61 0.00
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
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 Figure 7 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their reluctance to simplify. 
 
Figure 8 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their sensitivity to operations. 
 
Figure 9 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their commitment to resilience. 
 
Figure 10 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their deference to expertise. 
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Finally the framework could also benchmark against peers. A high level comparison of companies C and D 
(table 19) shows both organisations to be close on the average high level behaviours. They are both on the same 
maturity level 3 with pulls towards level 2. There are also fairly pulled towards level 4 at 0.62 and 0.77 
respectively.  
Table 19: High level comparison of companies C and D 
 
 
A closer look at the detailed comparison (table 20) would highlight the key differences. In their sensitivity to 
operations, company C is at maturity level 3 with slightly more pull level 2, while Company D is more mature at 
level 4 with slightly higher pull towards level 3 is slightly. All the HRO principles for the peers could be 
compared in the same way. 
 
Table 20: Detailed comparison of companies C and D 
 
 
5.4  Organisational learning and Improvement using FORM  
The route organisations would choose to improve their organisational reliability would be determined by 
amount of resources they are willing to commit. For best results, a gradual and wholesome implementation is 
suggested. The improvement actions would normally be in a gradual and stepwise manner, in which case, the 
organisations would take incremental actions to improve their maturity one level at a time and grow the maturity 
over time. This approach is similar to the observations of O’Neil & Krane (2012) where they concluded that 
HRO characteristics improve incrementally over a long period of time as long as the leadership commits to 
supporting the change and are able to motivate the whole organisation to support the initiative. This gradual and 
incremental approach could potentially pose some challenges in cases where the pull towards a higher maturity 
level is very high. A pull of 0.95 towards from level 3 towards level 4 (Company B in table 17) suggests that the 
organisation already exhibits a lot of level 4 behaviours. A smarter decision in this case would therefore be to 
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT
COMPANY C 0.59 0.77 ML 0.62 0.14
COMPANY D 0.56 0.88 ML 0.77 0.39
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT
COMPANY C
Preoccupation with failure 11.33 22.22 38.44 20.44 7.56 LEGEND
Reluctance to Simplify 16.94 35.83 30.00 16.94 0.28
Sensitivity to operations 5.76 25.15 35.76 24.85 8.48 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
Commitment to resilience 7.22 17.50 41.94 28.33 5.00 HIGH PULL
Deference to expertise 40.83 26.25 19.17 12.08 1.67
COMPANY D
Preoccupation with failure 13.33 26.22 35.78 23.56 1.11 LEGEND
Reluctance to Simplify 21.11 28.89 25.56 18.89 5.56
Sensitivity to operations 10.61 16.97 20.30 32.12 20.00 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
Commitment to resilience 6.11 26.11 36.11 15.28 16.39 HIGH PULL
Deference to expertise 27.08 23.75 20.83 17.08 11.25
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
begin to implement level 5 behaviours instead of committing resources on level 4 behaviours. Where the 
organisation is at maturity level 5, it would be expected to sustain the maturity by continuously assessing its 
behaviours against the level 5 behaviours. 
 
Vogus & Sutcliffe (2007b), O’Neil & Krane (2012) and Weick & Sutcliffe (2015) cited leadership and policy 
makers, as well as the trust in these leaders as the engines that drives the organisational reliability improvement. 
They would make the policies and act build trust among organisation towards mindfulness. This trust eventually 
begins to drive the organisation towards maturity. Where an organisation is unable to the commit resources 
required to implement all 5 HRO principles at the same time, it could chose to commit more resources to its 
weakest principle(s) as a means of boosting the average maturity level. This route must be used in conjunction 
with an organisational risk analysis. Labib et al (2009), in their work on total reliability and maintenance 
management awards observed that although all measures of quality are important, there are different weights 
assigned to different factors in the design of the elements of such an award. This paper assumes an equal 
weighting for all the 5 HRO principles. An organisational risk analysis might recommend a different weighting 
for the principles due to the prevalent risk factors. Company B might for instance, consider preoccupation with 
failure to be its most vulnerable point and could choose to commit more resources to it. This does not preclude 
the organisation from striving for reliability in all five principles as one of the defining characteristics of 
collective mindfulness is the simultaneous presence of high levels of each of the five HRO principles. A future 
research will investigate the applicability of different weighting scales for the HRO principles.  
 
The Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM2) is used in conjunction with the Framework for 
Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) to propose organisational improvement behaviours. Considering 
Company G and H (table 21), both organisations are at maturity level 2 with pulls towards level 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21: Applying ORM2 to Company G and Company H 
 
From ORM2, and considering preoccupation with failure, both organisations do not report near misses or 
incidents, neither is there a process in place to manage incidents. They consider failure to be the result of 
someone’s error and there are punishments for people found to cause a failure. The managements are considered 
as being difficult to approach. Both organisations pull strongly towards level 2 at 0.81 and 0.83 respectively, 
meaning that a large percentage may have already started to report some incidents or near misses, but there is no 
defined process to manage incidents, neither is there a formal communication channel with management. A 
smart recommendation would therefore be for the organisations to begin to implement level 3 behaviours. Such 
behaviour would include developing and implementing a formalised incident management process, 
communication process, and rewards process. A robust incident management process would include a feedback 
process to improve future process design, modify existing process or implement cultural change. Similarly, both 
organisations are also on maturity level 2 in their reluctance to simplify with high pulls of 0.70 and 0.64 
respectively. Again, the smart recommendation would be to implement level 3 behaviours that aim at process 
standardisation.  
 
While Company H is at level 1 in commitment to resilience with a high pull of 0.93 towards level 2, Company G 
is at level 2 with a high pull of 0.75 towards level 3. Company H would therefore be smart enough to begin to 
encourage level 3 behaviours, while Company G would encourage level 4 behaviours. All the behaviours would 
be defined in ORM2. Finally both organisations are at level 1 in their deference to expertise. While Company H 
has a pull of 0.75 towards level 2, Company G has a pull of 0.68 towards level 2. Company H is additionally 
being pulled strongly 0.52 towards level 3, while Company G is additionally being pulled strongly at 0.58 
towards level 3. The smart choice would therefore be to begin to encourage level 4 behaviours in both 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.48 0.00 0.28 0.01
4 0.76 3.33 7.14 5.83 1.61 3.74 0.10
3 9.52 27.98 26.88 16.67 22.50 20.71 0.53
2 40.67 43.93 40.00 37.14 32.50 38.85 0.00
1 49.05 24.76 25.06 39.88 43.39 36.43 0.94
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.17 0.50 0.17 0.00
4 2.53 3.67 6.91 13.33 11.25 7.54 0.21
3 13.73 28.50 31.45 26.00 22.75 24.49 0.69
2 37.47 41.00 38.36 34.67 26.00 35.50 0.00
1 46.27 26.83 23.09 25.83 39.50 32.30 0.91
COMPANY H (RESTAURANT CHAIN)
COMPANY G (RESTAURANT CHAIN)
organisations. At level 4, the most senior would normally yield responsibility to the most experienced people 
during an emergency with emphasis is on yield, as the process is intentional and not out of coercion.  
  
6.0  Conclusions 
The paper explores important and often neglected aspects of HRO research – How can organisations become 
reliable?  How do we measure the reliability of the organisation? Can this measurement be extended to diverse 
organisations? To what purpose would this be? Our development of ORM2 a staged maturity model for 
organisational reliability and FORM, the framework for organisational reliability maturity, as well as their 
deployment in eight diverse organisations in different industries leads us to conclude that it is possible to 
measure organisational reliability and develop a standardized framework for it. We also conclude that HRO 
principle could potentially be deployed by any organisation irrespective of location, size, or type of industry. We 
recommend a staged and gradual implementation for best results. We also conclude that organisations could use 
this measurement framework for self-assessment, to predict the potential to improve or retrogress, to 
benchmark, and for organisational learning and performance improvement towards higher reliability. We find 
that with an improved mindfulness, organisations would tend towards more error free operations and therefore 
towards improved safety. We also find that this framework has the key features of scalability, simplicity, and 
ease of use.  
 
Future research extend the diversity and expand the study further into more industries and organisations with 
varying degrees of complexity, coupling, size, and age. This research used an equal weighting scale for all HRO 
behaviours. Another research would seek to investigate the applicability of different weighting scales for the 
HRO behaviours as done for quality dimension and see if this could potentially help organisations towards 
higher reliability.  
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